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Estuaries are last in line as a recipient of river water and for this reason they are 
particularly vulnerable to negative environmental impacts due to water scarcity and 
pollution.  They only receive the runoff that has not been abstracted or prevented from 
reaching rivers.  When this runoff is substantially reduced their functionality is 
undermined and they often become less attractive for recreational use.  This paper 
explores some aspects entailed in efficiently managing the allocation of water to 
estuaries problem and some associated problems.  It is shown that efficient 
management requires the marginal social costs of the inflows to be brought into 
equivalence with the marginal social values of the inflows, and these values may be 
estimated, but that there are the challenges in this estimation and in linking these 
estimates to the welfare of the people in whom the managers of river systems are 
(presumed to be) interested.  
   





South Africa has a coastline of about 3 000 km (Baird 2002:37) and along this 
coastline there are a large number of estuaries – 289 by some counts (Hattingh et al 
2002:5), 465 by others (Baird 2002:37).  The status of an increasing proportion of the 
255 South African estuaries, that can be classified as “functioning” (Lamberth and 
Turpie 2003:1), is being threatened by reduced freshwater inflows, especially the 
status of those estuaries classed as temporary open/closed (Schalacher and 
Wooldridge 1996).  The main cause of the reduced freshwater inflow is increased 
abstraction to satisfy upstream freshwater demand, but another well documented 
cause of reduced inflows is the displacement of indigenous vegetation by higher water 
consuming alien vegetation within the river catchments (Hosking et al 2002).  
      Estuaries are reliant on uninhibited access to marine and freshwater links in order 
to function properly (Adams 2001, Lamberth and Turpie 2003:2) but because less 
water is reaching them they are yielding less services (Whitfield and Wood 2003), for 
instance, smaller areas available for recreational boating and losses of habitat for 
species of fish, birds and vegetation.  
     However, these consequences, unfortunate as they are, do not necessarily indicate 
that the freshwater in South African rivers is being misallocated, with too little being 
received by estuaries.  River water yields value to many users in South Africa - to 
households, industrialists, farmers, foresters and government institutions. The demand 
for water inflows into estuaries by people wishing to use the services of these 
estuaries for recreation, is but one of many.   Given the limits of supply, it is 
inevitable that some demand will not be satisfied.  In fact this is a problem that is 
most likely to get even worse in the future.  At current rates of growth in demand it 
has been estimated that by the year 2025 South Africa will have a population of       
70 000 000 and all its exploitable freshwater resources will be fully exploited 
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(Schalacher and Wooldridge, 1996).     
     Nevertheless concerns have increased in South Africa during recent years, 
especially among government agencies charged with environmental conservation, that 
there may be a misallocation problem, with too little river water reaching the estuary, 
i.e., being allocated to the recreation users of estuary services (Adams 2001).  The 
economic rationale underlying these concerns is not so much that there has been a 
deterioration in estuary service levels as that the services yielded by the estuaries have 
strong public good properties and that key relevant public policy makers have seemed 
up until recently to have been largely ignorant of the close connection between the 
river inflows and levels of service yielded by estuaries.  Public good characteristics 
are well known to render the market deficient as a mechanism for signalling the 
demand, causing market failure.  Ignorance of relevant information by public decision 
makers would most likely result in this information failing to be taken into account in 
public decisions, causing government failure (and hence a double failure).    
     Recent actions by South Africa’s Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) and Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) reflect this 
concern.  DWAF have set about re-examining the basis by which river water is 
allocated in South Africa, particularly with a view to incorporating conservation 
demand.  The National Water Act of 1998 requires catchment management authorities 
to be established. One of its functions is to ensure that demand for freshwater inflows 
into estuaries is taken into account in the management of catchments. 
      Similarly, South Africa’s Directorate of Marine and Coastal Management (which 
falls under DEAT) and local authorities have actively sought to formulate policies 
aimed at countering the degradation of estuaries. One of the requirements imposed 
upon local authorities is that they integrate into their development planning sensitivity 
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to the ways estuaries work and the services and goods they deliver.1  The relevant 
legislation making this a requirement is the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000.  
     This paper offers advice on the issue of managing current river inflows allocated to 
the estuaries of South Africa.2  It is generally accepted that sound water resource 
management requires the benefits and costs of different water allocations be 
compared and an optimum determined (Loomis 1998). The same principle applies to 
the current allocation of river water (freshwater) inflow into estuaries.    
     The paper is organised in the following way: an optimum current inflow is defined 
in terms of marginal values, a method is identified by which to estimate these values 
and various complications are discussed relating to the use of these estimates as 
proxies for the relevant marginal values.   
 




The optimum freshwater (river) inflow (Q*) into a given estuary at any given time is 
defined at that level where the positive difference between the total social value and 
the total social cost of this inflow is maximised, or put differently, where the marginal 
                                                 
1 In addition to stipulating how much freshwater they will permit to be removed from 
the inflow into the estuary, local authorities are required to formulate plans to guide 
what emissions they will allow into the estuary, what land uses they will permit on the 
banks and what resources (like fish, bait and mangrove trees) they will allow to be 
extracted from the estuary.  
2    The optimum flows over time are not discussed in this paper. 
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social value of the inflow equals the marginal social cost. The services generated from 
river inflow into estuaries are yielded and consumed mainly in the form of public 
goods, for instance, in areas suitable for boating, swimming and fishing.3  Total value 
is what the public would be willing to pay to consume the services, and the marginal 
value is what they would be willing to pay for an increment or decrement of the 
service, that is the sum of each individual’s (i = 1….n people) marginal value for this 
change, ∑ MVi.  The willingness to pay concept employed here is a composite one, 
including payments made directly and those made indirectly, for instance, through 
government.  It specifically includes willingness to pay of the current cohort of 
recreation users of the estuary, a scarcity cost component and an external cost 
component.  The scarcity cost component is the present discounted value of future 
willingness to pay for services foregone in the future as a result of the water 
reallocation being considered  - where there is long term damage done to the estuary 
service yield potential.  The external cost component is the payment that user groups, 
other than the estuary recreation group, would be willing to make for water that is 
allowed to flow to the estuary, below the point at which abstraction is being 
considered. 
      The total cost referred to above is the opportunity cost of the water flowing into 
the estuary, that is, the value of the water in its best alternative use, for example, in 
irrigating agricultural crops.  It too is a composite value.  It includes not only the 
willingness of the current user to pay, but also an external cost component.  The 
external cost component refers to the net willingness to pay of users, other than the 
abstractors, of the facilities built to abstract the water, e.g., the dams, canals and 
                                                 
3  Public goods provide nonexclusive benefits to everyone in a group and can be 
provided to one more user at zero marginal cost. 
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regulation/redirection of river water flows.  There may be a positive net willingness to 
pay for using these facilities.  There is considerable recreational use made in South 
Africa of these constructed water facilities, but in some cases this infrastructure also 
has undermined other recreational uses (like fly fishing).   
 
A model for allocating river water 
 
The concepts relevant to a model for allocating freshwater inflow into the estuary are 
defined below. 
Q = Freshwater inflow into estuary in m³ 
Q* = Optimum freshwater inflow into estuary in m³ 
∆Q = Change in freshwater inflow into an estuary in m³ 
P1 = Social value per m³ of a specified quantity of freshwater in the best 
alternative use to the estuary 
P2 = Social value per m³ of a specified quantity of freshwater inflow into 
the estuary to all users (including passive) of the estuary 
TC = Total opportunity cost per m³ of freshwater inflow into the estuary (for 
all people) 
 = f(P1; Q) 
MC = Marginal social cost of an incremental freshwater inflow into an 
estuary 
 = dTC/dQ 
 = P1.∆Q 
TV = Total value of freshwater inflow into an estuary (for all people) 
 = f(P2; Q) 
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MV = Marginal social value of freshwater incremental inflow into the estuary 
(for all people) 
 = dTV/dQ 
 = ∑ MVi (because of the public good nature of the services generated by 
the inflow) 
 = P2. ∆Q 
where  
i           =         1……..n people deriving utility from the freshwater inflow into the 
estuary. 
 
MC = P1 if ∆Q = 1 and  
MV = P2 if ∆Q = 1. 
     Optimisation takes place at the level of Q where the excess of TV over TC is 
maximised. A necessary condition for this optimisation to take place is that: 
MC = MV (1) 
which implies  
P1 = P2. (2) 
It follows that 
if P1 > P2,  
then (the current inflow of freshwater into the estuary) Q > Q* (the optimum inflow) 
and if  
P1 < P2,  
then Q < Q*. 
      A priori: 
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P1 =  f(Q) and dP1/dQ > 0 (3) 
P2 =  f(Q) and dP2/dQ < 0 (4) 
The P1 and P2 functions would be expected to change over time and, for this reason, 
the optimising conditions (Equations 1 and 2) would be expected to yield different 
values at different moments in, or periods of, time.  Given the nature of P1 and P2 
functions (Equations 3 and 4) it would be expected that at Q*: 
TC < TV 
 
THE MARGINAL SOCIAL VALUE AND MARGINAL SOCIAL COST 
FUNCTIONS 
 
The expected nature of the marginal value and marginal cost functions (also see 
Equations 3 and 4) are shown in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
     In Figure 1 the river inflow into the estuary is shown in m³ on the X-axis and the 
marginal value and marginal cost of it in Rand is shown on the Y-axis. As freshwater 
inflow into the estuary increases, the marginal value of this inflow decreases (by 
Equation 4), but the marginal costs associated with securing more freshwater 
increases (by Equation 3). 
     At the intersection of MV and MC the optimal freshwater inflow (Q*) is identified. 
At this level the excess of TV over TC is maximised. At any given time the actual 
freshwater inflow (Q) may, and most probably will, differ from the optimal inflow 
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(Q*). Such a situation, for instance, would be where Q = Q1.  
     At Q1: 
MV2” > MC1” and net TV (or TV – TC) can be increased by increasing Q.  
     For instance, if an increase of Q1Q2 is brought about, net TV increases by the 
vertical area between Q1 and Q2 and the MC and MV functions. After the increase, 
MV would have declined from MV2” to MV2’ and MC would have increased from 
MC1” to MC1’.  
     As it happens, in this case, further increases of Q would also be efficient. The 
optimum inflow into the estuary is Q*. 
 
THE OPTIMAL INFLOW GUIDE VERSUS THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESERVE GUIDE FOR MANAGING FRESHWATER INFLOWS 
 
One alternative to the optimal efficient inflow approach to guiding the allocation of 
freshwater inflows into estuaries is the environmental reserve approach.  In terms of 
this approach a certain amount of the mean annual runoff is set aside for the estuary 
and may not be abstracted.  This amount is set with reference to the minimum 
freshwater inflow needed to sustain a desirable level of environmental services and 
with reference to historical levels of environmental service delivery for that estuary 
(Adams, 2001).   
     It could be expected that for many cases the two guidelines (efficient optimum and 
minimum reserve requirement) would coincide in their recommendation, even though 
there are fundamental differences between the two.  There are at least two reasons to 
expect some measure of overlap between the two guidelines – a step like feature in 
the marginal value function where the minimum is defined, and the effect on the 
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efficiency calculus of incorporating future generation demands (scarcity costs).  
     Where the environmental services of the estuary are in demand, it stands to reason 
that if there is a precipitous fall in these services, their marginal value would increase, 
perhaps dramatically.  As a result, declines in freshwater allocation below an 
ecologically determined minimum would most likely be sub-optimal – because 
marginal values would become markedly higher (in a step like way) for freshwater 
inflows at base levels less than this ecologically defined minimum.  Moreover, if the 
consequent decline in service yields were expected to be enduring, a fall below an 
ecologically defined minimum inflow of freshwater, would be very difficult to justify 
in terms of multi-generational efficiency criteria, unless suitable compensation could 
be determined, and this is difficult to conceive (Holland 2002).   
     Notwithstanding there being many cases where the conclusions and 
recommendations yielded from these two guidelines converge (namely the 
environmental reserve requirement and efficiency criteria), there may be many other 
cases where the two guidelines yield conclusions and recommendations that diverge.  
In the latter cases the question will arise of what is most important to society – the 
efficiency of the economy or the conservation of the environment.  Economics has 
tended to favour the former.  
 
MEASURING THE RELEVANT MARGINAL VALUES 
Methods 
Efficient allocation of river water in South Africa requires management to be 
informed on both the MV and MC. There have been numerous attempts to estimate 
(or infer) values for MC in South Africa – using a mixture of marginal and average 
cost reference values (Hosking et al 2002) -  but there has been less work undertaken 
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on estimating (or inferring) values for the MV in South Africa.  
     Given the relative lack of work done on estimating P2 there would appear to be a 
strong case currently for devoting a bit more attention to doing so. In order to generate 
an estimate for P2, the first question one is faced with is which MV2 should be 
targeted for its estimation? The question is whether MV2” or MV2’ or MV2 should 
be targeted (see Figure 1)? Ideally the MV gained through the increase in inflow of 
Q1Q2 is estimated by MV2, where the excess valuation of Q3Q2 (value area CDE) is 
exactly offset by the undervaluation of Q1Q3 (value area ABC). The alternative of 
MV2” would yield too high an estimate of the MV (by value area AGE), while MV2’ 
would yield too low an estimate (by value area AFE).  
      In practice it is one of MV2” or MV2’ that is likely to be identified by empirical 
research – the value prior to an increment in freshwater inflow or a decrement. It 
follows that for a decrement of freshwater inflow, the price identified is likely to be 
MV2’, that is too low, but for an increment it is likely to be MV2”, that is too high. It 
would be expected that the error will be greater the greater the derivative of the P2 
function with respect to Q exceeds zero (see Equation 4) and the greater the change in 
Q being considered. 
      The second question one is faced with in estimating P2 is which method of 
valuation to employ.  In principle there are several methods by which MV2 may be 
identified, for instance, hedonic price method, travel cost method and the contingent 
valuation method (CVM). Of these the latter is the one most amenable to the required 
fine-tuning. This method may be used to generate average WTP per annum for a 
specified ∆Q at a given estuary. The estimated (or inferred) P2 (viz. P2) is defined as 
the product of this average and the total number of people with a demand for the 
services derived from the ∆Q, divided by the ∆Q:  
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P2 = TWTP/∆Q (5) 
where  total willingness-to-pay (TWTP) is defined as follows: 
TWTP =∑ MVi = n(AWTP),  
where, 
 i = 1…n people with a demand for estuary services. 
and 
AWTP = a before-the-∆Q average WTP for a specified change in water inflow into 
the estuary, as estimated by the CVM (either MV2’ or MV2” in Figure 1, depending 
on the direction of the specified change) 
and 
∆Q = specified change in freshwater inflow measured in m³. 
     Related to this second question is a credibility issue – in what sense the measure 
generated for P2 (in the case of CVM it is a stated preference measure) is indeed an 
acceptable proxy for the marginal social value of freshwater flowing into the estuary.  
This problem is three-fold.  One aspect relates to the use of a response to a 
hypothetical question on willingness to pay as equivalent to a market generated value 
based on what people actually do pay – the contingent valuation debate.  Another 
aspect relates to the omission of scarcity and external costs components.  Yet another 
aspect relates to the plausibility of these responses reflecting social values, taking into 
account welfare complications that could be anticipated.   
 
Controversy over contingent valuations    
 
The CVM is a widely applied but controversial valuation technique (Azevedo et al 
2003).  It is widely used because it is very flexible and may be used to assess the 
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values of a wide variety of non-market goods and services (Carson et al 2001).  In 
particular, it has advantages in incorporating passive values into the total value 
estimate.  Its credibility depends on there being a close correspondence between 
expressed answers given to hypothetical questions (stated willingness to pay) and 
voluntary exchanges in competitive markets that would be entered into if money did 
actually change hands.   
      The fact that it has proved very difficult to establish this correspondence has led to 
CVM being subject to criticism.  At the empirical level some authors have argued that 
it is much better not to generate any numbers at all than the misleading ones that some 
past CV studies have generated (Diamond and Hausman 1994).  At the theoretical 
level some authors have argued that those researchers applying the CVM make 
‘category’ mistakes by attempting to value (moral) judgements as if they were 
(economic) preferences (Keat 2002). 
     Many aspects of the ‘obvious’ errors in the ways the CVM has sometimes been 
applied, have been addressed - in the form of using standard methods to reduce biases, 
the adoption of conservative elicitation formats and the reporting of tests for 
consistency with economic theory.  Subject to these checks and balances being taken 
into account many feel that the results should be taken seriously by decision makers 
(Carson et al 2001).   One of the common checks is for consistency with economic 
theory.  Recommended guidelines for applying the method have emerged during the 
past 25 years, e.g., those drawn up by the Blue-Ribbon panel and Arrow et al (1993). 
These guidelines are ideals, but are frequently not fully adhered to – often because 
budget limitations preclude this, for instance, that relating to sample size. 
 
Omissions of marginal scarcity and marginal external costs 
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The estimated value, P2, is a valuation of willingness to pay for freshwater inflow by 
recreation users of the estuary.  It is only part of the complete social benefit of water 
being allowed to flow into the estuary.  Other potentially important components of the 
social benefit are the scarcity cost of any future estuary services foregone as a result 
of abstraction of the freshwater upstream, and the willingness to pay of groups beside 
the estuary recreation users, for the water not to be abstracted upstream. 
     Plausible reasons for discounting these omissions are that the values of these 
components would be expected to be negligible or that there are exact equal offsetting 
external benefits derived through the infrastructure built to abstract the water 
upstream.  It may be reasonable in some cases to argue cases along these lines, but 
clearly it cannot be assumed to be generally true.   The researcher seeking to provide 
guidance on the issue of water allocation to the decision makers will have to consider 
the merits of each case with respect to the marginal scarcity and external costs.    
 
Welfare complications in applying the equivalent pricing rule as a guide to 
efficiency 
 
One additional way of checking the efficiency analysis results for credibility is 
through the direct consideration of social welfare issues.  If the social efficiency 
analysis is accurate a welfare analysis should yield results that are consistent with it.    
     For the purpose of considering the welfare implications relevant to the efficient 
allocation of river water it is convenient to define social welfare in terms of the utility 
derived from two groups of water users – the upstream abstractors and the estuary 
recreation users.  The social welfare (W) implications of changes in river inflows may 
then be considered in terms of the utility (U1) derived by those abstracting water 
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upstream (-Q) and the utility (U2) derived by those using services dependent on river 
inflow into the estuary (Q): 
W = W[U1(-Q); U2(Q)] (6) 
     It would be expected that the respective utilities would be increasing functions in  
–Q and Q, and welfare an increasing function in the respective utilities. 
     Assuming a linear welfare function in the respective utilities and equal welfare 
weighting, a first order condition for a welfare optimum of the constrained 
maximisation problem is: 
MU1 = MU2                                                                                               (8) 
where MU1 and MU2 are the partial derivatives of user groups 1 and 2 with respect to 
m3 water allocations. 
     The main implication of this condition is that under the relevant assumptions, 
welfare optimality requires MU1 to equal MU2.    For this reason, if the estimated 
prices (P1 and P2) are brought into equivalence through appropriate management 
actions, welfare analysis would require that this allocation also make MU1 to equal 
MU2.  However, it may not do so.  There are many factors that may prevent this 
marginal utility condition from being met.  For instance, if one group are using the 
water as a necessity and the other as a luxury, or if one group enjoys high incomes 
and the other low incomes, this MU equivalence may not be met, a priori.    
     These factors will now be considered. 
DIFFERENCES IN USE OF THE WATER ALLOCATION  
Marginal utilities in the consumption of water will differ widely among the users of 
upstream river water.  Households in South Africa are entitled to a minimum of 30 kl 
of fresh water as a basic human right, but many have yet to receive this right, and 
among those that have, there is wide variation in consumption levels.  Similarly in 
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production, some firms are more productive with the water they use than others, and 
the goods the water is used to produce vary from luxury type goods to necessities.    
     The relevance of this variation is that marginal utility foregone (and marginal 
output foregone) through reallocations of water will differ widely.  For this reason, 
there may be welfare reasons for re-allocating water even when estimated water prices 
are brought into equivalence, or alternatively, not re-allocating water even where 
estimated prices suggest that it would be efficient to do so.  For instance, the finding 
that P2>P1 would suggest that efficiency could be improved by re-allocating water 
from upstream users to the users of estuary services.  However, if the upstream 
abstraction of water under consideration is targeted at satisfying basic needs for water 
in poor households and the estuary service users are mainly ski boat fishermen on 
holidays, a welfare analysis would suggest the exact opposite to be the preferred 
management action in terms of the efficiency analysis.  In this case it would seem 
likely that the marginal utility of the upstream water users would be higher than the 
marginal utility of the estuary service recreation users, and welfare would not be 
increased by allocating more water to the recreation users of estuary services.   
     On the other hand, if the upstream abstraction of water being considered is targeted 
at sustaining gardens of alien vegetation, topping up private swimming pools, etc., 
i.e., at facilitating the consumption of luxury goods, a priori there would be no 
marginal utility complications corresponding with a finding that it would be efficient 
to allocate more water from upstream abstractors to users of estuary services, because 
P2 > P1.    For this reason, in addition to estimating P1 and P2 it would seem prudent 
for those aiming to provide guidance to decision makers on water allocations to 
include consideration of what change in usage of this water will be entailed through a 
reallocation, and if the marginal utility implications of that reallocation yield welfare 
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results that are consistent with the efficiency implications.  Due to the diverse nature 
of consumption patterns within the relevant user groups, identification of the 
appropriate users may be difficult.   
DIFFERENCES IN INCOME BETWEEN THE USER GROUPS 
There are many factors that influence willingness to pay values, besides expected 
marginal utility, for instance, income levels and the prices of related goods.  That the 
value of water should be influenced by the prices of related goods is important from 
an efficiency perspective.  However, the fact that higher levels of income will 
generally induce higher willingness to pay, ceteris paribus, is problematic from a 
welfare perspective.   
 
     The relation between income and utility/welfare is indirect and controversial, but 
to the extent that there is any consensus on the relation, it is that diminishing marginal 
utility from income is more likely to be experienced by people than constant or 
increasing marginal utility from income.  If one accepts this proposition one is led to 
the conclusion that where income levels differ between the two users, the relative 
prices paid by people will not correspond with the relative respective relative 
marginal utilities.  In terms of the theory of diminishing marginal utility of income the 
price being paid by the user group with the lower income should correspond with a 
higher marginal utility than the equivalent price paid by the higher income group.  
     It follows that for those seeking to provide guidance to decision makers on the 
allocation of river water, they should carefully consider whether there are significant 
differences in income levels between the two water using groups.  For instance, it 
would be relevant if the income levels were higher of the recreation users of estuary 
services than were those targeted for the water upstream.  Once again, due to the 
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diverse spread of incomes within the relevant water user groups, identification of the 




That there are adverse consequences for estuaries in South Africa of freshwater 
deprivation has been widely documented (Lamberth and Turpie 2003:2, Whitfield and 
Wood 2003).  As could be expected, the government has acted to address the problem 
with new legislation that creates catchment management authorities to take estuary 
freshwater needs into account, inter alia, and compels local authorities to incorporate 
sensitivity to estuary services in their development planning (where this is applicable).  
The current state of thinking within catchment management authorities and local 
development planners about how to incorporate the required sensitivity is still at the 
formative stage.  Much of the discussion has been orientated around the idea of 
setting aside freshwater reserves for estuaries in order attain target estuary quality 
standards (Adams 2001).   
     This paper has advocated that management of freshwater allocations to estuaries 
should be guided by the idea of an optimal freshwater inflow rather than the idea of a 
freshwater reserve.   The allocations of freshwater inflow into South African estuaries 
are optimal when the marginal social values of the inflow are brought into 
equivalence with the marginal social costs.  For this reason catchment management 
may be guided towards optimal allocation of freshwater inflow into estuaries, by 
reference to estimates of the relevant marginal social costs and marginal social values.  
The CVM may be usefully employed for the purpose of estimating the marginal social 
values – arguably the more difficult of the two to estimate. 
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      However, there are notable complications in attempting to employ this apparently 
simple decision rule for the purpose of allocating river water to estuaries.  Stated 
preference valuations are inherently controversial in character, and for this reason 
estimates generated this way need to be qualified.   Secondly, irrespective of whether 
stated or revealed preference valuations are employed, there are checks that should be 
made for relevant value omissions and for welfare inconsistencies.  In order to address 
some of the complications associated with the latter, there may be advantage in 
guiding management decision making by simultaneously (in the same analysis) 
presenting several other appraisal criteria together with the efficiency criterion (of 
bringing the relevant prices into equivalence) – a multi-criteria mapping approach 
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Figure 1: Expected Marginal Social Value and Marginal Social Cost functions 
 
